The Asianist

Balanced and fact-based analysis of Asian affairs

Posts Tagged ‘israel

Does Netanyahu Really Want to Attack Iran?

leave a comment »

For all the escalating rhetoric and drama surrounding Israel’s potential attack on Iran, there are still many who doubt the seriousness of such a scenario.

In analyzing the recent meeting between US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Vali Nasr, professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, thinks that most of this is hot air and the the US and Israel are just playing good cop-bad cop with Iran. On the likelihood of an actual attack, Nasr told NewsHour on PBS:

I don’t think it’s likely at all. It’s rhetoric designed to force the U.S.’s hand. The Obama administration actually likes it because it puts pressure on Iran. It’s like good cop-bad cop. It allows Obama to say, ‘you can either deal with me, or you can deal with Israel, which has made very clear that they want to attack you.’ It’s not a given that Netanyahu would attack or not attack, but if they do, they could conceivably look as bad as that Turkish flotilla debacle.

There may be even more reason to question the wisdom of an Israeli attack given the domestic political dynamics there. In a rare look at this dimension a few days ago, Daniel Levy wrote a piece for Foreign Policy, arguing that Netanyahu is a risk-averse politician who does not need to take a gamble on Iran in order to shore up his popularity at home. Here’s Levy:

A tendency characterizing Netanyahu’s long term in office, and a counterintuitive one at that, is the degree to which he has been risk-averse, not only in matters of peace, but also in matters of war. No Operation Cast Leads, Lebanon wars, or Syria Deir ez-Zor attack missions under his watch. In fact, he has no record of military adventurism. What’s more, Netanyahu hardly appears to be in need of a Hail Mary pass, military or otherwise, to salvage his political fortunes. Polls consistently show that he is a shoo-in for reelection. The right-wing block in Israel currently has a hegemonic grip on Israeli politics, something that seems unlikely to change. Netanyahu secured his own continued leadership of the Likud party in Jan. 31’s primary. His primacy on the right faces few challenges from either within the Likud or beyond it. Despite never winning favor with much of the mainstream media, the messy management in his own office, and the challenges of coalition balancing (particularly over issues of religion and state), Netanyahu maintains solid approval ratings with a relatively strong economy and can even now bask in Israel’s lowest unemployment numbers in 32 years.

He goes on about the risk of an attack on Iran, calling it “possibly the biggest threat to Bibi serving a third term” given strong domestic political opposition among former security establishment figures:

Former security establishment figures at the highest levels have mounted an unprecedented campaign warning Israel’s leader and its public of the follies of launching a solo and premature Israeli military action against Iran. Most outspoken has been recently retired Mossad chief Meir Dagan, who has described a strike on Iran as “the stupidest thing I have ever heard.” But he has not been alone. Other former IDF chiefs of staff, as well as Shin Bet and intel leaders, have joined the cautioning chorus. Many are unlikely to shut up if Bibi defies their counsel. And in the public arena, these voices cannot be dismissed as just so many self-serving chickenhawk politicians. The fallout from an attack on Iran is possibly the biggest threat to Bibi serving a third term.

To this we can add some poll figures released last week by Shibley Telhami on whether Israelis support a strike on Iran. Here’s a summary of what Telhami found, though the numbers themselves are fascinating and I’d encourage readers to look at them in greater detail:

They don’t support a strike without U.S. backing, a new poll shows, even though they are not fearful of Washington’s retribution if they go against U.S. advice. They appear less influenced by the rhetoric of U.S. politicians competing for their embrace, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the Obama administration’s reluctance to support a military strike against Iran has apparently not affected their preference for Obama as the next president. In fact, their views seem to partly reflect the White House’s assessment of the consequences of war and the problems created by military action.

Given all this, it is worth at least asking how credible this war of words really is, even if it is impossible to predict exactly what Israel’s actions in the future will be.

David Sanger on Iran, Israel and the Nuclear Threat

leave a comment »

On Tuesday, I attended a luncheon lecture by renowned New York Times correspondent David Sanger here at the Fletcher School on Iran. The talk was organized with the help of Professor Vali Nasr, the Fletcher Iran Working Group, Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, and International Security Studies Program.

As with most public events, the talk was more of an opportunity to confirm things being heard and understand the mindset of the various actors from an influential and informed voice, rather than a treasure trove of new information. These are some of the key points I picked up.

  • While it is clear that Iran’s nuclear program has encountered difficulties and slowed down (part of which is political), Sanger doesn’t think that the Iranians need an actual bomb to make their point. He said, “I still don’t think they have made the decision to go for a weapon, and I’m not sure they need to. A virtual weapon gives them as much leverage as an actual weapon”.

Others have also made this point. My former professor at the University of Virginia, Michael Krepon, puts it this way:

If Iran’s national leaders calculate that there are greater risks in crossing nuclear red lines than in observing them, they might stop short of acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran’s leaders might decide not to go the whole nine yards if perceived penalties – being locked into pariah status, facing punishing economic sanctions, and having Muslim neighbors take out their own nuclear insurance policies – are considered to be sufficiently injurious.

  • On Israel’s thinking regarding Iran, Sanger said that if he were Israeli and he was considering an attack on Iran, he would do so before the US presidential election, since the timing and context would give President Obama room to express concern at the consequences while stating his understanding about why it was done to preserve Israel’s security. That timeline is consistent with what we have been hearing over the last couple of weeks.
  • While there is a whole spectrum of views in Israel, there is a growing thought process among some that if attacked, Iran would not respond significantly with direct attacks on US and Israel since that would trigger a war that it would lose. According to this line of thinking, the response would be much less dramatic and very asymmetrical, focused on responding in Afghanistan and other places for instance. This is crucial because if the Israelis perceive the Iranian response to be much weaker, that could increase the likelihood of a strike.

David Ignatius also briefly mentioned this school of thought in his Washington Post piece earlier this month. Here’s Ignatius:

Israelis are said to believe that a military strike could be limited and contained…Iranians would retaliate, but Israelis doubt that the action would be an overwhelming barrage, with rockets from Hezbollah forces in Lebanon. One Israeli estimate is that the Jewish state might have to absorb 500 casualties…Israelis point to Syria’s lack of response to an Israeli attack on a nuclear reactor there in 2007. Iranians might show similar restraint, because of fear the regime would be endangered by all-out war.

  • On the American side, Sanger said some in the Obama administration do still believe that a nuclear Iran is containable. And with its aggressive cyber program and tough sanctions (the first round of sanctions, in his view, to actualy bite), the administration “cannot find the rationale” for contemplating a military invasion right now.
  • Moving forward, even tougher sanctions could be possible on Iran since these are not the toughest sanctions yet. Kicking Iran out of SWIFT, which provides banks with a system for moving funds around the world, is one option, although the US worries that this might affect regular Iranians and may interfere with other American intelligence priorities. Vali Nasr also added that while sanctions may weaken the regime, it may also undermine the regime’s ability to negotiate and merely reinforce its commitment to attaining a nuclear capability. That’s consistent with what he told the New York Times last month:

“Look at it this way…sanctions are weakening the regime, but they’re also putting pressure on the regime, which is arriving to the point where the Iranians have no motivation other than to get their nuclear capabilities faster.”

On a more humorous note, Sanger said that if Iran was indeed behind the scrappy attempts at assassinating a Saudi ambassador in Washington and the recent bombing attempts, then “they certainly haven’t brought out their A-team”. The audience erupted in laughter. But one has to wonder what lies ahead should Tehran decide to continue on its current path. Like many vexing foreign policy problems, there aren’t really any good options.

Fareed Zakaria and How Not to Deter Israel from an Iranian Strike

leave a comment »

In his latest column, Fareed Zakaria makes yet another attempt to deter Israel from attacking Iran through what I call ‘deterrence by history’. The trite argument is deceptively simple: history suggests that states which perceive that they have a ‘closing window to act’ while they still have an advantage are often wrong, and deterrence has worked in the Cold War and even on North Korea and Pakistan thus far. What’s to say that the Iranians won’t be deterred as well?

Zakaria, and the troves of others who have argued along similar lines, could well be right: a nuclear Iran, even if it comes to pass, may be deterred by the threat of mutually assured destruction – especially with over a hundred nuclear weapons over in Israel. And, ideally, Israel would recognize that while absolute security is impossible to achieve, deterrence is less disastrous than preventive war, and it would therefore not be wise to strike Iran over the next few months.

But what Zakaria et. al seem to forget is that we have to contend with a world as it is rather than the world as it should be. The leaders of nation states do not run their foreign policies based on historical analogies and strict rationality. Even if they do at time, this is filtered through their unique lenses and combined with threat perceptions, domestic politics, their nation’s historical experience, various psychological quirks, and so on.

That’s precisely why this deterrence by history amounts to little more than intellectual masturbation. Resolving this impasse practically requires understanding the Israeli position, even if one disagrees with it, in order to affect a change in behavior, rather than simply telling them how they should think.

Israeli leaders aren’t stupid. They understand that a strike on the main sites of Iran’s nuclear program may potentially result in reprisals, regional war, retaliation by Iran or Hezbollah, the resurgence of a regime currently under siege, and a rupturing of relations between it and the West. Some within the Israeli military are also aware of the logistical difficulties such an attack presents, and the limitations of their own capabilities.

But Israel’s leaders, particularly its current prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, also believe equally firmly that a nuclear Iran poses the gravest threat to the survival of the Jewish people since Hitler. They live within missile range of a regime that has called for the extinction of their state, and has shown clear signs of aggression – including the Iranian assassination attempt against a Saudi diplomat in Washington and recent bomb attacks and attempts in Thailand, India and Georgia. They feel isolated in a changing Middle East after the Arab Spring, and they are growing less and less confident that US President Barack Obama will attack Iran under any circumstances.

For these reasons and more, the Israelis draw their red line at the Iranian acquisition of a nuclear capacity, not just the actual production of a nuclear weapon. They remain unconvinced the tactics of dissuasion are keeping Iran from marching towards a abomb, and they no not believe that the logic of deterrence would work on a future nuclear Iran.

If the United States and other countries (and commentators) really want to effectively persuade Israel to hold off on striking Iran, I would suggest they spend their time more constructively on doing two things rather than beating deterrence by history to death. First, be clear about the specific types of Iranian actions that violate their red lines, and what they would do if those red lines are crossed (covertly, overtly or otherwise). This would help convince the Israelis to trust that enough is being done to try and change Iranian behavior through non-military means, and that there is consensus on a point (if it exists) that the Iranians cannot cross.

Second, impress upon the Iranians that they need to demonstrate meaningful progress on a negotiated settlement. There are various diplomatic proposals out there, but the goal would essentially be to somehow verifiable guarantee that Iran’s nuclear program will remain a civilian one by combining restrictions – like limitations on enrichment or ‘fuel swap’ proposals – with various carrots like the phased lifting of sanctions. The Iranians have already signalled a willingness to talk, and I don’t think Israeli strikes are something they desire either.

These two measures may not work in the end, but they are at least worth trying. And it’s far more useful to try to change the behavior of states as they exist today, rather than ignoring their idiosyncracies and hoping they learn from the lessons of yesterday.

Is Israel Going to Attack Iran Soon?

leave a comment »

David Ignatius thinks so:

 [Defense Secretary Leon] Panetta believes there is a strong likelihood that Israel will strike Iran in April, May or June — before Iran enters what Israelis described as a “zone of immunity” to commence building a nuclear bomb. Very soon, the Israelis fear, the Iranians will have stored enough enriched uranium in deep underground facilities to make a weapon — and only the United States could then stop them militarily.

Panetta did not deny making those comments yesterday when asked about them.

The Obama administration, Ignatius says, is in “intense discussions” about what an Israeli attack would mean for the United States. In general, however it appears to favor “staying out of the conflict unless Iran hits US assets”. To deter Israeli action, Washington could either step up talks with Iran to reach some sort of compromise (leading some to believe this may be a ploy to bring Tehran back to the table) or increase covert actions to a level deemed disruptive enough to convince the Israelis than an attack is not required.

In any case, the Israelis, according to Ignatius, seem to be more than willing to do it themselves:

Israeli leaders are said to accept, and even welcome, the prospect of going it alone and demonstrating their resolve at a time when their security is undermined by the Arab Spring.

“You stay to the side, and let us do it,” one Israeli official is said to have advised the United States. A “short-war” scenario assumes five days or so of limited Israeli strikes, followed by a U.N.-brokered cease-fire. The Israelis are said to recognize that damage to the nuclear program might be modest, requiring another strike in a few years.

Israelis are said to believe that a military strike could be limited and contained. They would bomb the uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz and other targets; an attack on the buried enrichment facility at Qom would be harder from the air. Iranians would retaliate, but Israelis doubt that the action would be an overwhelming barrage, with rockets from Hezbollah forces in Lebanon. One Israeli estimate is that the Jewish state might have to absorb 500 casualties.

Israelis point to Syria’s lack of response to an Israeli attack on a nuclear reactor there in 2007. Iranians might show similar restraint, because of fear the regime would be endangered by all-out war. Some Israelis have also likened a strike on Iran to the 1976 hostage-rescue raid on Entebbe, Uganda, which was followed by a change of regime in that country.

AEI’s Danielle Pletka, writing from Israel, is not convinced. But she does note the profound sense of isolation Israel is feeling:

I’m still betting the Israelis won’t hit Iran quite yet, because guesses about the consequences are just that. Nor is it entirely clear to me that any strike really solves the problem. And the rumors don’t jibe well with other rumors that Netanyahu plans to call elections this summer, cynics notwithstanding.

Still, who the hell knows. The one thing I can say with certainty is that Israel feels very isolated. The Arab Spring elicits little interest, negative or positive. Iran’s soft underbelly, Syria, might as well be in the Arctic Circle for all Israelis in official circles appear to care. But I wonder, do the Israelis understand they have only one bite at the apple? Do they understand that there is a chance that much of the world will stand with them soon, but not yet? Probably not, because while many are talking at them, they appear to be talking to no one.

Alarm bells always seem to be periodically sounding on this question. But this round appears to have a much more serious feel to it.

Written by Prashanth Parameswaran

February 3, 2012 at 10:25 am

Is Israeli Society Moving Away from Peace?

leave a comment »

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses Congress today, 15 years since he last did so as prime minister. What has changed in Israel since then?

In his latest piece for Foreign Affairs, Daniel Levy notes some interesting statistics and trends within Israel over the past two decades that might affect the prospects for Arab-Israeli peace.

The article is valuable for two reasons. First, on an issue as sensitive as this one, it is important to try to unearth numbers to back up your claims regardless of how difficult that task might be. Mr. Levy has at least attempted to do so. Second, more time should be spent understanding the changing societal realities within Israel and the Palestinian territories rather than just focusing on the role of outside actors and domestic politics, lest grand strategy become out of touch with ground realities.

For these two reasons, I will quote extensively and directly from Mr. Levy’s article (available here) based on his research. Some of the trends he has found include:

  • Righward shift: Over the last 15 years, Israel’s parliament, politics and public discourse have all shifted to the right.
  • Demographic rise of Arabs and Haredi: The two fastest growing population groups are the Palestinian Arab community and the ultra-Orthodox Jews (known as the Haredi). The Haredi population has grown more than threefold over only 20 years, from 3 percent of the population in 1990 to 10 percent today. Estimates suggest that by 2028, Haredim will represent a quarter of all children in Israel under 14 and a third of Jewish children that age.
  • Worries about ‘Democratic Frailty’: Many older, more established elite groups in the Israeli secular political establishment, academia, and media have a growing concern over what they see as Israel’s fragile democracy, driven by a sense that Israel lacks a set of universally shared democratic values among its increasingly self-segregated population. The influence of the Russian population on democracy, in his view, is especially worth noting. Almost 20 percent of Israeli citizens are immigrants from the former Soviet Union who have arrived over the past two decades. This Russian-speaking community, coming from authoritarian states, is relatively less at home with democratic politics.
  • Expansion of Shas schools: There has been a rapid expansion of the state-funded but independent education system established by the ultra-Orthodox Shas party. Over the past 20 years, the number of Jewish primary school students enrolled at ultra-Orthodox schools has grown from just over 7 percent to more than 28 percent. This has great implications for Israeli society and its economy: the Shas system and other ultra Orthodox schools teach a narrowly religious curriculum that is less geared to providing pupils with the necessary skills to compete in a modern economy.
  • Integration/Employment of Haredis and Palestinian Arabs: A combination of state policies and cultural norms has meant that both Haredi and Palestinian-Arab communities have low rates of labor-force participation: for example, only 40 percent of Haredi men and 19 percent of Palestinian-Arab women work. To compound the strain on Israel’s economy, Haredi men often spend a lifetime in state-subsidized religious education centers or yeshivot. One think tank report warns that if no state efforts are made to integrate these two populations, they will “deal a blow to Israel’s future as a developed and prosperous state”.
  • Greater resonance of exclusivist policies: The tendency for politicians to exploit Jewish-Arab relations for political gain with anti-democratic and at times unashamedly racist legislative initiatives targeting the Palestinian-Arab community has found great resonance in the Israeli public. According to a 2010 survey by the Israel Democracy Institute, 86 percent of the Jewish public believe that decisions critical to the state should be undertaken only by a Jewish majority; 53 percent support the government’s right to encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel; and 55 percent say greater resources should be allocated to Jewish communities than to Arab ones.
  • Rise of ultra-orthodox settlement orientation: In the last 15 years, the population of Israeli settlers in the West Bank alone has more than doubled, from 142,000 in 1996 to over 300,000 today. The settler population in East Jerusalem, meanwhile, has grown from 160,000 to over 200,000 in the same period. The demographic makeup of the settlements themselves has also changed. While settlements catering to the ultra-Orthodox population barely existed in 1996, the two fastest-growing settlements today – Modiin Illit and Beitar Illit – are both ultra-Orthodox (their combined population is 80,000 today, compared to 10,000 in 1996). It is worth noting that the average age in Moddin Illit is ten years old, the lowest of any Israeli city. Clearly the political influence of the ultra-Orthodox settlers will only grow in the coming decades.
  • Rise of Religion in the IDF: The Israeli Defense Forces, the state body responsible for the security of those settlements, has undergone quite a transformation. Since the 1990s, the number of religious soldiers in infantry units and among the officer class has grown steadily, such that a third of all IDF officers today are religious.

I’ll let readers decide and debate what the implications of these trends might be for Arab-Israeli peace, and to what extent they are worrying.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 94 other followers